Prospects of Composite Dialogue between India and Pakistan after Sharm el Sheikh

The debates over prospects of dialogue between India and Pakistan have acquired a key stage in Indian discourse since the bilateral peace process got stalled when Pak based terrorists attacked India’s commercial capital Mumbai in November 2008. The 26/11 attack spiralled down the bilateral relations to a low predicting doom to the bilateral relations. At least a revival within a year’s span was far from sight. The joint statement on 16 July 2009 at Sharm el Sheikh not only revived the prospects of bilateral dialogue, but also brought into surface the common ground of both the countries on issues of terrorism with Pakistan’s promise to do ‘everything in its power’ to bring the perpetrators of the Mumbai attacks to justice.
The dialogue as envisaged in the joint statement might have earned applaud for the leaders of India and Pakistan in international media, but drew flak from significant section of Indian analysts. Probably, the joint statement has never been subject to as much debates and examinations in India as this time. The prime minister of India’s vision of promoting bilateral relations with Pakistan became subject to interrogation not from the opposition parties but also from his own political party with the argument that he conceded too much ground to Pakistan without getting anything in return. Here are the arguments:
First, the joint statement appeared tilted in favour of Pakistan position that composite dialogue needs to be started between the neighbours despite the ongoing deadlock on the issue of terrorism. India has been insisting unless Pakistan takes credible action against the culprits of Mumbai attack there is no possibility of dialogue. This is what the Indian Prime Minister Manmohan Singh exactly conveyed to the Pak President, Asif Ali Zardari in June 2009 at Yekaterinburg at the sidelines of the SCO summit. But contrast to this, the joint statement signed by prime ministers of India and Pakistan on 16 July 2009, at the sidelines of the 15th NAM summit, reads, “Action on terrorism should not be linked to the Composite Dialogue process and these should not be bracketed.” Apparently, it favours Pakistan’s position which has accused India for the stalled peace process after the Mumbai terror attack.
Interestingly, this interpretation of the statement may not be absolute. The contrary may be true that terrorism and composite dialogue can not be linked together, i.e. it is not imperative that actions against terror elements can not be taken unless there is composite dialogue. But, then arises the epistemological question: which comes first—whether Pakistan’s credible actions against terror elements or the composite dialogue. It will ostensibly depend on the kind of interpretation one makes. The prime minister of India emphatically stated in the Indian parliament on 17 July 2009 that Pakistan cannot be given a blank cheque to perpetrate, or to give patronage to terrorist elements to create havoc in India, and expect India at the same time to shake hands with it. In a move, either calibrated or coincidental, one of the main accused behind the Mumbai attack, the Lashkar-e-Toiba Chief, Hafeez Saeed was released from arrest just before few days of the meeting of the prime ministers in Egyptian Red Sea resort. Hence, it also appears rational that Pakistan must show ground result, and then only can composite dialogue be initiated in an atmosphere of friendliness and trust. In this sense, the joint statement fortified the Indian standpoint that dialogue and terrorism can not be linked together.
Second, the significant section of Indian establishment has found it difficult to see the inclusion of the word Balochistan in the joint statement. It is for the first time the term entered into any joint statement between India and Pakistan. The prime minister of India argues that India’s policy to Pak troubles is an open book, there is nothing to hide. Hence, if Pakistan wants to include the term then India has no problem. The joint statement reads, “Pakistan has some information on threats in Balochistan and other areas.” The Indian analysts ask: what was the urgency to include the term in the joint statement? It is true that there is problem in Balochistan since the creation of Pakistan. There are grievances of the people since the instrument of accession signed by the Khan of Kalat with Pakistan in 1948. India has as a matter of policy kept its hands off from the affairs of Pakistan. But, Pakistan as a matter of policy has often accused India of fomenting violent activities in Balochistan.
Hence, it is no surprise that Pakistan’s prime minister, Yusuf Raza Gilani after returning home told Pak media India’s implicit admission of its involvement in internal affairs. The Pak media as well as public rejoiced at the success of the Pak diplomacy. Probably, the Indian prime minister had a different objective, vision in his mind while allowing the term to slip in the bilateral document, but the hard headed diplomacy goes beyond idealistic thinking, and now Pakistan gets a brownie point to score over India and raise the Baloch problem as India’s making.
From an Indian point of view, the non-inclusion of the K word might be comforting though its implicit admission was there in the bilateral document. Both the countries agreed to resolve ‘all the outstanding issues,’ which also included the issue of Kashmir. Perhaps, it is the implicit admission on part of both the countries terrorism other than Kashmir has become the biggest curse to the subcontinent. Besides terrorism, both the countries recognised the challenges of poverty and underdevelopment afflicting the subcontinent and resolved to eliminate the factors which prevent “our countries from realising their full potential.” The joint statement also noted “India’s interest in a stable, democratic Islamic Republic of Pakistan.”
But, how far both the countries would work together for a better future of the people is yet to be seen in coming days. The joint anti-terror mechanism constituted aftermath of the Havana NAM summit in 2006 has almost reached a dead end without yielding any fruit. The mutual suspicion is so deep; both the sides find it difficult to erase the old sheltered menace of distrust. The contrasting interpretations of the joint statement fortify to this fragile nature of bilateral relations.
However, it is something that the joint statement can bring to the reality. That something needs to be positive. An infinite distrust or hatred is neither sustainable nor practicable between the two neighbours who share many things in common besides the border. Hopefully, by the time when the foreign secretaries of both the countries meet at the sidelines of the United Nations in August 2009, the dialogue process moves forward at least by inches if not miles.