India-Pakistan dialogue at foreign ministers level in Islamabad can be justly called statist as it added nothing substantial to bilateral relations except meetings and press conferences bordering acrimony. Anyone who viewed the joint press conference of the ministers on 16 July 2010 could conclude nothing but precisely this: the post-Mumbai terror attack relations are surviving on a vague optimism that relations will get better in due course. Despite this optimism expressed opulently by the political leaders of both the countries, the fact remain unless some substance is added to the relations, South Asia will further plunge into another bout of crisis. In international politics diplomacy and dialogue are good things to salvage bad relations, but these can not sustain long in a vacuum.
Since February 2010 when direct official talks started between India and Pakistan after a gap of about one and a half year, hopes have gathered momentum among the civil society members who love peace and stability that something positive will come out gradually. While the constituent of peace is squeezed after the Mumbai attack, nonetheless this constituent has never dithered in advocating peace at whatever cost. India-Pakistan relations have to be guided by the principles of peace and co-existence, and no matter how furious and degenerating the extremist elements with extremist agenda, India and Pakistan with nuclear weapons can not but promote dialogue and deliberation to arrive at any amicable solution to the vexed issues including the issue of Kashmir. The hard line elements in both the countries are not interested in peace as they promote hatred and animosity, in which there interest is served at the cost of peace loving citizens of both the countries.
The meeting of prime ministers of both the countries in the Bhutanese capital Thimpu in April 2010 further increased the peace constituency and raised the hope that something positive will come out. Both the prime ministers emphasized on the initiatives to bridge ‘trust deficit’ between the two countries. Prime Minister Singh of India, known for his peace overtures to Pakistan despite criticism from sections at home, has promised to ‘walk extra mile’ to promote friendly relations with Pakistan. The radical elements do not like these overtures. They call the prime minister ‘evil’ and want to punish India by promoting terrorist violence for its positions on contentious issues. While the civil society of India and Pakistan want peace and stability, the extremist elements always want to see both the country at loggerheads. Whether it is Al Qaeda or Lashkar-e-Toiba or Jaish-e-Mohammad, they are pronounced opponents of India-Pakistan dialogue.
The point that needs emphasis that both the countries need to come out of rigid frameworks of policy making and think in broader terms. Two particular issues that drag the peace process in South Asia are the following. While India insists that Pakistan must punish the culprits of Mumbai attack, Pakistan demands that the issue of terrorism has to be dealt separately and India has to bring to table other contentious issues like Kashmir. In fact after the revelations of David Coleman Headley India’s demand for action from Pakistan has become further emboldened. The recent foreign ministers’ meeting discussed all the contentious issues including that of terrorism and Kashmir but without any conclusive outcome. Both the parties did not issue any joint statement and as the joint press conference showed, both the ministers disagree on a bitter note on various issues. On a question to Pakistan foreign minister about the hate speech of the Lashkar chief, Hafeez Saeed, the foreign minister delivered elusive statements with overtones implicating India for the similar activities.
Despite allegations and counter allegations, complains and counter complains, the overall agreement that could come out is that both the countries will meet again in near future. Pakistan foreign minister alleged that his Indian counterpart did not come fully prepared and that he will not be going to India for some picnic, referring to India’s unpreparedness. Indian foreign minister countered by saying that he was not in Pakistan for sightseeing and did not invite his Pak counterpart for any such activities but some serious engagements. The only succor was that the Pakistan leadership took the dialogue in a positive note and expressed hope that dialogue and deliberation is the only way forward. It remains to be seen how far this resolve will be supported by the army, which plays a decisive role in the decision making process in Pakistan. The Indian leadership too is optimistic that peace and dialogue is the only way forward to resolve the contentious issues.
The point that needs emphasis is: how far the dialogue will continue without any substantive outcome? Mere exercise in dialogue without breaking the trust deficit will lead nowhere but ensconce the radical spirit that all these exercises are niceties in vain and these are ploys to divert attention from core issues, and the only way to solve the issues is war and violence. Besides, the patience of the civil society in both the countries may wear thin in passing days, which may give rise to pessimism that nothing positive will happen in bilateral relations and the political leaders are at best can fix dates for dialogue, but without any substantial result. Such a development will be precarious as it will put the framework and the spirit behind the composite dialogue into jeopardy, and goad extremist elements into action.
On a wider front the India-Pakistan relations are more complex as these are not confined to the issues of terrorism or Kashmir, but also issue of strategic rivalry, sphere of influence in Afghanistan, and also the issue of control over natural resources like water. Both the foreign ministers attended the Kabul conference on 20 July 2010, but again the bilateral differences and more so the inherent distrust and acrimony pulled back the leaders towards achieving any concrete result, and thus weakening the constituent of peace and dialogue in South Asia.
Published in Transcend Media Service Weekly, July 26-August 1, 2010
Showing posts with label Composite dialogue. Show all posts
Showing posts with label Composite dialogue. Show all posts
Monday, July 26, 2010
Tuesday, November 24, 2009
Prospects of Composite Dialogue between India and Pakistan after Sharm el Sheikh
The debates over prospects of dialogue between India and Pakistan have acquired a key stage in Indian discourse since the bilateral peace process got stalled when Pak based terrorists attacked India’s commercial capital Mumbai in November 2008. The 26/11 attack spiralled down the bilateral relations to a low predicting doom to the bilateral relations. At least a revival within a year’s span was far from sight. The joint statement on 16 July 2009 at Sharm el Sheikh not only revived the prospects of bilateral dialogue, but also brought into surface the common ground of both the countries on issues of terrorism with Pakistan’s promise to do ‘everything in its power’ to bring the perpetrators of the Mumbai attacks to justice.
The dialogue as envisaged in the joint statement might have earned applaud for the leaders of India and Pakistan in international media, but drew flak from significant section of Indian analysts. Probably, the joint statement has never been subject to as much debates and examinations in India as this time. The prime minister of India’s vision of promoting bilateral relations with Pakistan became subject to interrogation not from the opposition parties but also from his own political party with the argument that he conceded too much ground to Pakistan without getting anything in return. Here are the arguments:
First, the joint statement appeared tilted in favour of Pakistan position that composite dialogue needs to be started between the neighbours despite the ongoing deadlock on the issue of terrorism. India has been insisting unless Pakistan takes credible action against the culprits of Mumbai attack there is no possibility of dialogue. This is what the Indian Prime Minister Manmohan Singh exactly conveyed to the Pak President, Asif Ali Zardari in June 2009 at Yekaterinburg at the sidelines of the SCO summit. But contrast to this, the joint statement signed by prime ministers of India and Pakistan on 16 July 2009, at the sidelines of the 15th NAM summit, reads, “Action on terrorism should not be linked to the Composite Dialogue process and these should not be bracketed.” Apparently, it favours Pakistan’s position which has accused India for the stalled peace process after the Mumbai terror attack.
Interestingly, this interpretation of the statement may not be absolute. The contrary may be true that terrorism and composite dialogue can not be linked together, i.e. it is not imperative that actions against terror elements can not be taken unless there is composite dialogue. But, then arises the epistemological question: which comes first—whether Pakistan’s credible actions against terror elements or the composite dialogue. It will ostensibly depend on the kind of interpretation one makes. The prime minister of India emphatically stated in the Indian parliament on 17 July 2009 that Pakistan cannot be given a blank cheque to perpetrate, or to give patronage to terrorist elements to create havoc in India, and expect India at the same time to shake hands with it. In a move, either calibrated or coincidental, one of the main accused behind the Mumbai attack, the Lashkar-e-Toiba Chief, Hafeez Saeed was released from arrest just before few days of the meeting of the prime ministers in Egyptian Red Sea resort. Hence, it also appears rational that Pakistan must show ground result, and then only can composite dialogue be initiated in an atmosphere of friendliness and trust. In this sense, the joint statement fortified the Indian standpoint that dialogue and terrorism can not be linked together.
Second, the significant section of Indian establishment has found it difficult to see the inclusion of the word Balochistan in the joint statement. It is for the first time the term entered into any joint statement between India and Pakistan. The prime minister of India argues that India’s policy to Pak troubles is an open book, there is nothing to hide. Hence, if Pakistan wants to include the term then India has no problem. The joint statement reads, “Pakistan has some information on threats in Balochistan and other areas.” The Indian analysts ask: what was the urgency to include the term in the joint statement? It is true that there is problem in Balochistan since the creation of Pakistan. There are grievances of the people since the instrument of accession signed by the Khan of Kalat with Pakistan in 1948. India has as a matter of policy kept its hands off from the affairs of Pakistan. But, Pakistan as a matter of policy has often accused India of fomenting violent activities in Balochistan.
Hence, it is no surprise that Pakistan’s prime minister, Yusuf Raza Gilani after returning home told Pak media India’s implicit admission of its involvement in internal affairs. The Pak media as well as public rejoiced at the success of the Pak diplomacy. Probably, the Indian prime minister had a different objective, vision in his mind while allowing the term to slip in the bilateral document, but the hard headed diplomacy goes beyond idealistic thinking, and now Pakistan gets a brownie point to score over India and raise the Baloch problem as India’s making.
From an Indian point of view, the non-inclusion of the K word might be comforting though its implicit admission was there in the bilateral document. Both the countries agreed to resolve ‘all the outstanding issues,’ which also included the issue of Kashmir. Perhaps, it is the implicit admission on part of both the countries terrorism other than Kashmir has become the biggest curse to the subcontinent. Besides terrorism, both the countries recognised the challenges of poverty and underdevelopment afflicting the subcontinent and resolved to eliminate the factors which prevent “our countries from realising their full potential.” The joint statement also noted “India’s interest in a stable, democratic Islamic Republic of Pakistan.”
But, how far both the countries would work together for a better future of the people is yet to be seen in coming days. The joint anti-terror mechanism constituted aftermath of the Havana NAM summit in 2006 has almost reached a dead end without yielding any fruit. The mutual suspicion is so deep; both the sides find it difficult to erase the old sheltered menace of distrust. The contrasting interpretations of the joint statement fortify to this fragile nature of bilateral relations.
However, it is something that the joint statement can bring to the reality. That something needs to be positive. An infinite distrust or hatred is neither sustainable nor practicable between the two neighbours who share many things in common besides the border. Hopefully, by the time when the foreign secretaries of both the countries meet at the sidelines of the United Nations in August 2009, the dialogue process moves forward at least by inches if not miles.
The dialogue as envisaged in the joint statement might have earned applaud for the leaders of India and Pakistan in international media, but drew flak from significant section of Indian analysts. Probably, the joint statement has never been subject to as much debates and examinations in India as this time. The prime minister of India’s vision of promoting bilateral relations with Pakistan became subject to interrogation not from the opposition parties but also from his own political party with the argument that he conceded too much ground to Pakistan without getting anything in return. Here are the arguments:
First, the joint statement appeared tilted in favour of Pakistan position that composite dialogue needs to be started between the neighbours despite the ongoing deadlock on the issue of terrorism. India has been insisting unless Pakistan takes credible action against the culprits of Mumbai attack there is no possibility of dialogue. This is what the Indian Prime Minister Manmohan Singh exactly conveyed to the Pak President, Asif Ali Zardari in June 2009 at Yekaterinburg at the sidelines of the SCO summit. But contrast to this, the joint statement signed by prime ministers of India and Pakistan on 16 July 2009, at the sidelines of the 15th NAM summit, reads, “Action on terrorism should not be linked to the Composite Dialogue process and these should not be bracketed.” Apparently, it favours Pakistan’s position which has accused India for the stalled peace process after the Mumbai terror attack.
Interestingly, this interpretation of the statement may not be absolute. The contrary may be true that terrorism and composite dialogue can not be linked together, i.e. it is not imperative that actions against terror elements can not be taken unless there is composite dialogue. But, then arises the epistemological question: which comes first—whether Pakistan’s credible actions against terror elements or the composite dialogue. It will ostensibly depend on the kind of interpretation one makes. The prime minister of India emphatically stated in the Indian parliament on 17 July 2009 that Pakistan cannot be given a blank cheque to perpetrate, or to give patronage to terrorist elements to create havoc in India, and expect India at the same time to shake hands with it. In a move, either calibrated or coincidental, one of the main accused behind the Mumbai attack, the Lashkar-e-Toiba Chief, Hafeez Saeed was released from arrest just before few days of the meeting of the prime ministers in Egyptian Red Sea resort. Hence, it also appears rational that Pakistan must show ground result, and then only can composite dialogue be initiated in an atmosphere of friendliness and trust. In this sense, the joint statement fortified the Indian standpoint that dialogue and terrorism can not be linked together.
Second, the significant section of Indian establishment has found it difficult to see the inclusion of the word Balochistan in the joint statement. It is for the first time the term entered into any joint statement between India and Pakistan. The prime minister of India argues that India’s policy to Pak troubles is an open book, there is nothing to hide. Hence, if Pakistan wants to include the term then India has no problem. The joint statement reads, “Pakistan has some information on threats in Balochistan and other areas.” The Indian analysts ask: what was the urgency to include the term in the joint statement? It is true that there is problem in Balochistan since the creation of Pakistan. There are grievances of the people since the instrument of accession signed by the Khan of Kalat with Pakistan in 1948. India has as a matter of policy kept its hands off from the affairs of Pakistan. But, Pakistan as a matter of policy has often accused India of fomenting violent activities in Balochistan.
Hence, it is no surprise that Pakistan’s prime minister, Yusuf Raza Gilani after returning home told Pak media India’s implicit admission of its involvement in internal affairs. The Pak media as well as public rejoiced at the success of the Pak diplomacy. Probably, the Indian prime minister had a different objective, vision in his mind while allowing the term to slip in the bilateral document, but the hard headed diplomacy goes beyond idealistic thinking, and now Pakistan gets a brownie point to score over India and raise the Baloch problem as India’s making.
From an Indian point of view, the non-inclusion of the K word might be comforting though its implicit admission was there in the bilateral document. Both the countries agreed to resolve ‘all the outstanding issues,’ which also included the issue of Kashmir. Perhaps, it is the implicit admission on part of both the countries terrorism other than Kashmir has become the biggest curse to the subcontinent. Besides terrorism, both the countries recognised the challenges of poverty and underdevelopment afflicting the subcontinent and resolved to eliminate the factors which prevent “our countries from realising their full potential.” The joint statement also noted “India’s interest in a stable, democratic Islamic Republic of Pakistan.”
But, how far both the countries would work together for a better future of the people is yet to be seen in coming days. The joint anti-terror mechanism constituted aftermath of the Havana NAM summit in 2006 has almost reached a dead end without yielding any fruit. The mutual suspicion is so deep; both the sides find it difficult to erase the old sheltered menace of distrust. The contrasting interpretations of the joint statement fortify to this fragile nature of bilateral relations.
However, it is something that the joint statement can bring to the reality. That something needs to be positive. An infinite distrust or hatred is neither sustainable nor practicable between the two neighbours who share many things in common besides the border. Hopefully, by the time when the foreign secretaries of both the countries meet at the sidelines of the United Nations in August 2009, the dialogue process moves forward at least by inches if not miles.
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