Resolving Conflict on the Himalayas

The Himalayas, known as the rooftop of the world and considered an ecological wonder, are also a contested geopolitical landscape hosting three nuclear-weapon states. Conflicts involving China, India, and Pakistan are not new, but as the recent developments demonstrate they have assumed new forms with far-reaching implications.

Take, for example, the case of Kashmir. The erstwhile princely state got embroiled in a conflict between India and Pakistan after their independence in 1947. Pakistan considered the Muslim majority state a part of its Islamic identity and India considered it a part of its multiethnic identity. The conflict led the two neighbors to three wars, a limited war, and myriad border skirmishes. It got murkier in the 1980s with the support of Pakistan to militant movements within the Indian side of Kashmir. The internal violence led to the killing of thousands of people. As both countries acquired nuclear weapons in the late 1990s, a fear of a nuclear war grappled the region. China took control of a part of Kashmir during its war with India in 1962 and Pakistan handed over a part of its controlled Kashmir as a gesture of friendship in 1963.

Moving fast forward, the surgical strikes by India in recent years to destroy terrorist camps in Pakistan side of Kashmir and the withdrawal of special status accorded to the troubled region have been challenged by Pakistan, which in turn announced a new map declaring whole Kashmir as its part. This is a departure from its traditional position. While India has claimed whole Kashmir as its integral part from the beginning, Pakistan while controlling a part of it claimed it supported the right of Kashmiris to self-determination. The saber-rattling has intensified from both sides. Some analysts fear that the protracted conflict may witness a two-front war involving the two countries with China playing an active role. Early this month China raised the issue of Kashmir at the UN Security Council to internationalize it, but the move was opposed by the other members of the Council including the United States.

The proliferation of radical networks such as the Taliban, Haqqani Network, Lashkar-e-Toiba, and Jaish-e-Mohammad makes the situation further volatile. These networks with bases in the fragile border areas of Pakistan shape regional politics by acting spoilers of peace.

Like the border between India and Pakistan, the border between India and China is disputed since the drawing of the McMohan Line in 1914. The signing of Panchsheel or the five principles of coexistence, in 1954, which emphasized on territorial integrity and non-interference in internal politics, generated hopes for peace. The hopes, however, remained short-lived, as the two countries fought a war in 1962. China expresses discontent as India provides shelter to the Tibetan leader, Dalai Lama. India views with concern the increasing bonhomie between China and Pakistan. However, despite the continued border conflict and uneasy bilateral relations, India and China refrained from major violent engagement since the 1962 war, but until recently. In June 2020, while the world was busy with the COVID-19 pandemic, the soldiers of the two countries clashed at Galwan river valley, resulting in the death of 20 Indian soldiers. The clash drew international attention. In reference to China, the US Secretary of State Mike Pompeo said, “You can't threaten countries and bully them in the Himalayas.”

China’s Belt and Road Initiative has emerged as a point of major contention between the two countries. The proposed road passes through the disputed Kashmir. While China has emphasized that the project is a vector of its ‘peaceful rise’ and aims at regional economic integration, India has viewed it as a strategy for hegemony. India’s non-participation in the project is viewed as a challenge by the Chinese leadership. India also views the recent assertiveness of its neighbors such as Nepal as a Chinese ploy to undermine India’s influence in South Asia.

The conflict on the Himalayas has global implications. The democratic ‘quad’, comprising the US, India, Australia, and Japan, has expressed concern at the rise of authoritarianism and aggressive foreign policy in Asia. The United States has in the past decade changed its policy focus in the Asia-Pacific and termed the region Indo-Pacific, emphasizing the role of India in its Asia pivot. The conflict that has emerged at the rooftop of the world will have a spillover effect unless it is addressed through a spirit of democracy and dialogue. Violent conflict in the region has the potential to unleash humanitarian and ecological disaster beyond the Himalayas.

(Another version of this article of mine was published in Orlando Sentinel on August 25, 2020. https://www.orlandosentinel.com/opinion/guest-commentary/os-op-india-pakistan-china-conflicts-20200815-ltrch3rpkrbjtdfbticbweg5py-story.html)

Paradigm Shift in India-Paksitan Relations

Pakistan on 2 November 2011 decided to accord most favoured nation (MFN) status to India. The decision amidst the turbulent relations between the two countries certainly added a new dynamism to the relations with a plethora of advantages for bilateral trade and commerce, as well as for building confidence between the two countries towards resolving various contentious issues. Pakistan’s Information Minister, Firdous Ashiq Awan called the decision as taken in the ‘national interest,’ while India’s Commerce Minister, Anand Sharma called the change in Pakistan’s approach to this long pending issue as a ‘paradigm shift’ with wider implications for South Asia.

Under the rules of World Trade Organization the members need to accord MFN status to each other towards facilitating smooth flow of trade between the member countries. India had granted MFN status to Pakistan in 1996, and demanded the same status from Pakistan. Under the new arrangements, Pakistan will allow trade in more items by shifting to a system of negative list that restricts import of items mentioned in the list. So far, Pakistan uses a system of positive list that permits trade only in a handful of products, which are routed through third countries. For instance, in case of India-Pakistan trade, Pakistan allowed about 1933 items to be imported from India, while it allowed about 6000 items to be imported from other countries. Without going into technicalities, it needs emphasis that Indo-Pak trade are mostly shaped by the negatives in relations, which are mostly governed by political considerations; while the positives in the relations in terms of economic complementarities, socio-cultural connections, etc. are largely sidestepped. The recent move by Pakistan will no doubt add a new impetus to bilateral relations.

The political bracketing of relations has negatively impacted the two countries in various ways. From an economic point of view, the bilateral relations stand at a meager $2.7 billion. The restrictions made the trade prospects and free flow of goods and commodities suffocated. For example, the restrictions made the transport route of bilateral trade long and circuitous, and the goods and commodities were to travel through third countries. The tragedy is that despite both the countries are neighbours with dozens of cross-border routes which can be used for trade; these routes lie unused or used below capacity. Second, both the countries enjoy complementarities: while India can provide energy, pharmaceutical products, engineering goods, plastic goods, etc. to Pakistan; Pakistan can provide cement, textiles and surgical instruments, etc. to India. Under the South Asian Free Trade Agreement (SAFTA) which further complements MFN in the region, the South Asian countries including India and Pakistan need to provide preferential trade arrangements for bilateral trade by gradual pruning of the negative list. But, due to bilateral mistrust and animosity, these agreements have not been effective, while India has similar arrangements with Sri Lanka, Bangladesh, and other South Asian countries except Pakistan.

The jubilation among the peace activists as well as advocates of economic diplomacy is expectedly high. Pakistan’s Readymade Garments Manufacturers & Exporters Association (PRGMEA) stated, “Granting MFN to India is an economic issue by virtue of which we can gain a foothold into one of the fastest growing markets in the world. This step can bring millions of rupees to the exchequer in terms of additional export revenues and bring about job opportunities to thousands of unemployed youth of Pakistan.” President of the Federation of Indian Trade Organization, Ramu Deora stated, “It is a historic development. This will also have an impact on efforts to solve the political problems.” Similarly the Federation of Indian Chambers of Commerce and Industry (FICCI) issued a statement expressing hope that the new situation will help strengthen economic ties between the two countries. India’s Commerce Minister has expressed hope that the decision by Pakistan will certainly dawn a new era in bilateral relations. He stated, “It will be beneficial for both countries. It opens up new pathways of elevating our economic engagement to a much higher level. We are clear that economic engagements, removing barriers to trade and also facilitating land transportation will help the region. Eventually, economic activity and industrial activity will bring in prosperity and stability. It will generate jobs.” This sentiment was echoed by Pakistani Information Minister, who said, “We cannot live in regional isolation.”

The idea of giving economic diplomacy an upper hand over political differences was materialized gradually. In May last year, the meetings of business delegations from both the countries argued that the grant of MFN status by Pakistan will boost bilateral economic relations. In September 2011, during meeting of Commerce Secretaries of both countries, India and Pakistan agreed to boost bilateral trade to the level of $6billion in coming three years. This month foreign secretaries will meet to discuss in detail the modalities to govern the newly emerging economic relationship. Some of the issues which are likely to be discussed in forthcoming negotiations at various levels include: making flexible visa rules, provision of multiple entry visas to businessmen, easing of transportation facilities between the two countries, etc. Both the countries have already started cross-border trade in the region of Kashmir since 2008 as a peace measure, but the results have not become satisfactory. The lack of mutual trust plays the role of devil in this context.

The results of free flow of trade between India and Pakistan will be numerous as it will nullify many of the negatives in the relations. First, it will help in building confidence between the two countries. The detractors argue that unless the contentious political issues like Kashmir are resolved, it may not be wise enough to commence trade in full measure as it will belittle the controversial issues. Such arguments in the post-cold war era, in the globalized world where borders crumble or become flexible, land in sheer oddities and are no longer tenable. Rather, the reverse argument can be put forward that economic development can strengthen peace constituency, and goad political leaders towards amicable resolution of conflicts. Second, the new arrangement will help both the countries to meet many of their economic necessities in a complementary framework. It may give a push to larger plans like Iran-Pakistan-India and Turkmenistan-Afghanistan-Pakistan-India pipelines, and bring other countries of South Asia towards larger economic integration under the rubric South Asian Free Trade Area. It will also be economically convenient for both the countries to trade directly than to route goods and commodities through third countries. Third, it may help foster peace, stability and economic development in Afghanistan, as all the countries – India, Pakistan and Afghanistan – are well connected through land routes. Both the countries can cooperate with each other without much external interference towards developing and executing joint projects for reconstruction of Afghanistan, including reviving silk route trade in the wider Eurasian region. Obviously, one does not expect these ambitious ideas to be executed in a span of days or weeks. The most important thing which needs commendation is that the paradigm shift in relations will move the Indian subcontinent towards peace and development at least by few steps.

(This article was earlier published under my name in Strategic Culture Foundation web magazine)

Statist India-Pakistan Dialogue

India-Pakistan dialogue at foreign ministers level in Islamabad can be justly called statist as it added nothing substantial to bilateral relations except meetings and press conferences bordering acrimony. Anyone who viewed the joint press conference of the ministers on 16 July 2010 could conclude nothing but precisely this: the post-Mumbai terror attack relations are surviving on a vague optimism that relations will get better in due course. Despite this optimism expressed opulently by the political leaders of both the countries, the fact remain unless some substance is added to the relations, South Asia will further plunge into another bout of crisis. In international politics diplomacy and dialogue are good things to salvage bad relations, but these can not sustain long in a vacuum.

Since February 2010 when direct official talks started between India and Pakistan after a gap of about one and a half year, hopes have gathered momentum among the civil society members who love peace and stability that something positive will come out gradually. While the constituent of peace is squeezed after the Mumbai attack, nonetheless this constituent has never dithered in advocating peace at whatever cost. India-Pakistan relations have to be guided by the principles of peace and co-existence, and no matter how furious and degenerating the extremist elements with extremist agenda, India and Pakistan with nuclear weapons can not but promote dialogue and deliberation to arrive at any amicable solution to the vexed issues including the issue of Kashmir. The hard line elements in both the countries are not interested in peace as they promote hatred and animosity, in which there interest is served at the cost of peace loving citizens of both the countries.

The meeting of prime ministers of both the countries in the Bhutanese capital Thimpu in April 2010 further increased the peace constituency and raised the hope that something positive will come out. Both the prime ministers emphasized on the initiatives to bridge ‘trust deficit’ between the two countries. Prime Minister Singh of India, known for his peace overtures to Pakistan despite criticism from sections at home, has promised to ‘walk extra mile’ to promote friendly relations with Pakistan. The radical elements do not like these overtures. They call the prime minister ‘evil’ and want to punish India by promoting terrorist violence for its positions on contentious issues. While the civil society of India and Pakistan want peace and stability, the extremist elements always want to see both the country at loggerheads. Whether it is Al Qaeda or Lashkar-e-Toiba or Jaish-e-Mohammad, they are pronounced opponents of India-Pakistan dialogue.

The point that needs emphasis that both the countries need to come out of rigid frameworks of policy making and think in broader terms. Two particular issues that drag the peace process in South Asia are the following. While India insists that Pakistan must punish the culprits of Mumbai attack, Pakistan demands that the issue of terrorism has to be dealt separately and India has to bring to table other contentious issues like Kashmir. In fact after the revelations of David Coleman Headley India’s demand for action from Pakistan has become further emboldened. The recent foreign ministers’ meeting discussed all the contentious issues including that of terrorism and Kashmir but without any conclusive outcome. Both the parties did not issue any joint statement and as the joint press conference showed, both the ministers disagree on a bitter note on various issues. On a question to Pakistan foreign minister about the hate speech of the Lashkar chief, Hafeez Saeed, the foreign minister delivered elusive statements with overtones implicating India for the similar activities.

Despite allegations and counter allegations, complains and counter complains, the overall agreement that could come out is that both the countries will meet again in near future. Pakistan foreign minister alleged that his Indian counterpart did not come fully prepared and that he will not be going to India for some picnic, referring to India’s unpreparedness. Indian foreign minister countered by saying that he was not in Pakistan for sightseeing and did not invite his Pak counterpart for any such activities but some serious engagements. The only succor was that the Pakistan leadership took the dialogue in a positive note and expressed hope that dialogue and deliberation is the only way forward. It remains to be seen how far this resolve will be supported by the army, which plays a decisive role in the decision making process in Pakistan. The Indian leadership too is optimistic that peace and dialogue is the only way forward to resolve the contentious issues.

The point that needs emphasis is: how far the dialogue will continue without any substantive outcome? Mere exercise in dialogue without breaking the trust deficit will lead nowhere but ensconce the radical spirit that all these exercises are niceties in vain and these are ploys to divert attention from core issues, and the only way to solve the issues is war and violence. Besides, the patience of the civil society in both the countries may wear thin in passing days, which may give rise to pessimism that nothing positive will happen in bilateral relations and the political leaders are at best can fix dates for dialogue, but without any substantial result. Such a development will be precarious as it will put the framework and the spirit behind the composite dialogue into jeopardy, and goad extremist elements into action.

On a wider front the India-Pakistan relations are more complex as these are not confined to the issues of terrorism or Kashmir, but also issue of strategic rivalry, sphere of influence in Afghanistan, and also the issue of control over natural resources like water. Both the foreign ministers attended the Kabul conference on 20 July 2010, but again the bilateral differences and more so the inherent distrust and acrimony pulled back the leaders towards achieving any concrete result, and thus weakening the constituent of peace and dialogue in South Asia.

Published in Transcend Media Service Weekly, July 26-August 1, 2010